On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players

Pierre Bernhard (1) , Marc Deschamps (2)

1 BIOCORE - Biological control of artificial ecosystems
2 CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190)

We consider a dynamic game where additional players (assumed identical, even if there will be a mild departure from that hypothesis) join the game randomly according to a Bernoulli process. The problem solved here is that of computing their expected payoff as a function of time and the number of players present when they arrive, if the strategies are given. We consider both a finite horizon game and an infinite horizon, discounted game. As illustrations, we discuss some examples relating to oligopoly theory (Cournot, Stackelberg, cartel).

Mots clés: Dynamic game; Bernoulli process of entry; Oligopoly

Domaines: Informatique et théorie des jeux [cs.GT]

Pierre Bernhard, Marc Deschamps. On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players. 2015. ⟨hal-01377916⟩